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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FLORA KESLER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

SHERMAN BRIMLEY TATE and

BURTON L. TA TE,

Defendants and Respondents,

CASE NO.
12806

and
TRANSNATIONAL INSURANCE

COMPANY,

Intervenor and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APP'ELLANT
STATEMENT OF

THE KIND OF CASE

This is an action by plaintiff against the defendants,
uninsured tort-feasors, for property damage and bodily
injury sustained in an automobile accident. Plaintiff has
uninsured motorist insurance coverage with appellant who
seeks to enter this action as a party to protect its interests
therein. Both plaintiff and defendants object to intervention in this action by Transnational Insurance Company.
l

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Upon becoming aware of the initiation of this action
by plaintiff, her uninsured motorist carrier, Transnational
Insurance Company, made a Motion for Leave to Inter.
vene in this action in order to protect its interests therein.
Upon the hearing of the company's Motion, which was
resisted by both plaintiff and defendants, the District
Court of Salt Lake County, Honorable James S. Sawaya,
denied Transnational Insurance Company the right to intervene in the action. It is from that Order that Intervenor
appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Intervenor-Appellant, Transnational Insurance Company, seeks to have the Order of the Lower Court reversed
which denied it the right to intervene in this action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 22, 1970, plaintiff, Flora Kesler, was
driving her 1967 Chrysler automobile, and at the time in
question was apparently stopped at the intersection of
1300 South Street and State Street in Salt Lake City, Utah,
in obedience to a red traffic semaphore (R 1, 4). Defeo·
dant Sherman Tate, while driving a dump truck owned
by his father, Burton L. Tate, collided with plaintiff's ve·
hide. (R 1, 4). Plaintiff claims to have sustained personal
injury in the accident (R 2), which allegations defend·
ants deny. (R 4). The Tates also claim as an affirmative
defense that the accident was unavoidable as to defendant
Sherman Tate. (R 4).
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Prior to the time of the accident referred to above,
Transnational Insurance Company issued to plaintiff,
Flora Kesler, its automobile liability insurance policy
which provided, inter alia, coverage for damage or injury
caused by uninsured motorists. (R 16, 18). The Tates did
not have liability insurance on the truck which was involved in the accident with plaintiff (R 16, 18), therefore
the uninsured motorist coverage of plaintiff's policy with
Transnational Insurance Company is applicable.
Plaintiff filed her action against both defendants for
property damage to her car and bodily injury to herself
seeking a monetary award for general damages of $75,000.00, medical expenses of $400.00, loss of use of
$220.00, Court costs and other relief which the Court
deems proper. (R 1-2). Joel M. Allred, Salt Lake City attorney represents plaintiff in this action and Greg Hawkins of the firm of Henriksen, Fairbourn and Tate represents the defendants.
After the action was filed, appellant attempted to
participate in the defense of the action but was refused
such participation by defendants and their attorney.
Thereafter, appellant, by and through its attorney, D.
Gary Christian of the firm of Kipp and Christian filed its
Motion or Leave to Intervene in the action claiming the
right to litigate the matters of liability and damages by
way of filing an answer to plaintiff's complaint as a defendant intervenor in order to protect its interests. (R 1617). The Motion was argued before the Honorable James
S. Sawaya, one of the Judges of the District Court of Salt
Lake County on January 26, 1972. (R 41). At that time
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all counsel appeared for and on behalf of their clients
and the attorneys for plaintiff and defendants both resisted the insurance company's Motion to Interevene. (R 41).
After hearing argument from counsel for the respective parties, the Court being fully advised in the
premises entered its Order denying the Motion of Transnational Insurance Company to intervene in the action
for the purpose of protecting its interests on the issues
of liability and damages. (R 41-42).
It is from that Order that the company has prosecuted
this appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION OF TRANSNATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY FOR LEAVE TO
INTERVENE IN THIS ACTION.
Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure deals with '
intervention of right in certain legal actions. The rule
provides as follows:
Intervention of Right. Upon timely applica·
tion anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional
right to intervene; or (2) when representation of
the applicant's interests by existing parties is or
may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be
bound by a judgment in the action; or ( 3)
**

**
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The question therefore presented by this appeal is
whether or not Transnational Insurance Company has
the right to intervene in this action under the provisions
of Rule 24(a) and the facts of this case.
Appellant is unable to find any Utah cases directly
in point dealing with the question here presented for consideration. There are, however, cases which deal with
who may intervene and the requisite elements necessary
for such intervention.
In Dayton vs. Free, 49 Utah 221, 162 Pac. 614, the
Court held that the right to intervene is not limited to any
particular kind of action or proceeding. The intervenor
must have the requisite interest in the matter in litigation
and the interest must be a pecuniary one, not merely a
wish or a strong desire that either party should succeed.
The test usually applied to the right to intervene is
whether the person seeking intervention may gain or lose
by direct legal operation and the effect of the judgment
ultimately entered in the matter. Commercial Block
Realty Co. vs. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 83
Utah 414, 28 Pac.2d 1081.
In 67 C.J.S. Parties Sec. 59(d) it states:
Intervention by a person primarily or ultimately liable to one of the parties with respect to
the claim in suit has been considered proper where
the requisites for intervention are otherwise
present.
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Appellant respectfully asserts that on the basis of
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the tests set
forth in the cases quoted that it should be permitted to
intervene in this action. Certainly Transnational Insurance Company is not represented in this action and coun.
sel for both plaintiff and defendants have resisted the
Company's efforts to have its counsel represent its interests
in this suit. It appears obvious that appellant is or may be
bound by a judgment in this action in favor of plaintiff
and against defendants. The interest of the company
herein is a pecuniary interest since it is the only one who
will respond in money paid on any judgment entered. If
it is required so to do Transnational Insurance Company
would certainly lose as the Court determined in Com·
mercial Block Realty Co. vs. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., supra.
Even though there are no Utah cases which have
previously dealt with this problem, there are cases from
other jurisdictions directly supporting the right of an
insurance carrier, such as appellant herein, to intervene
in cases like the one at hand.
In Matthews vs. Allstate Insurance Company, 194
F. Supp. 459 (1961) the Federal District Court in Virginia
was faced with an action by an insured occupant of an
automobile to recover from her insurance carrier the
amount of an unpaid judgment that she had obtained
against an uninsured motorist. The Court held the in·
surer liable to the plaintiff insured for the amount of the
judgment even though the insurer wasn't a party to the
action indicating that the insurance company could have
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intervened in the action had it chosen to do so. Since it
did not intervene, having had a right to do so, the insurer was bound by the judgment even though its interests
may not have been protected. In discussing the company's
liability the Court said:
Since the requirement of establishing legal
liability of the uninsured motorist has been fully
met by the plaintiff herein, the defendant's liability automatically attaches to that extent. Id. at
465.
Again the Court said:
There is little doubt that the state court, with
knowledge of the interest of the insurance company, would have appointed defendant's counsel
as the attorney for Manning and Singleton. Id.
at 464.
In disposing of the case the Court noted that even though
Virginia has a statute prohibiting the joinder of an insurance company as a party defendant in such cases, the
statute did not prevent intervention since "the statute is
undoubtedly for the benefit of the insurer and does not
foreclose the right to be added as a party defendant at its
request where it is clear that the insurer has a definite
interest in the action" and where all other avenues of
appearance and defense are closed.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
vs. Lester E. Brown, et al., 114 Ga. App. 650, 152 SE2d
641 (1966) was a case in which Brown brought suit
against one Blakely as defendant and State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company as nominal defendant
7

for damages arising out of an automobile collision allegedly caused by the negligence of Blakely. Blakely was an
uninsured motorist and State Farm had issued an automobile liability insurance policy to Brown which provided for uninsured motorist coverage. The trial court over.
ruled the insurer's general demurrer and motion to purge,
but granted its application to intervene, and the insurer
appealed and plaintiff cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the insurer could not be made a party
defendant, but had a right to intervene, even though the
case was not in default.

In discussing the insurance company's application to
intervene the Court stated at 152 SE2d 641, page 646:
We recently held that under the uninsured
motorists law the plaintiff's insurer has a constitu·
tional right to urge, inter alia, the non-liability
of the uninsured motorist where the case is in default as to him to contest the jurisdiction of the
court. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. vs.
Glover, supra. We are unable to distinguish this
decision on the ground that the case was in default
as to the uninsured motorist, and we conclude that
it must be followed.
The Court further said at page 646:
The insurer does have a direct and immediate
interest to protect in this kind of action, and it
stands to lose or gain by the direct effect of the
judgment.
The case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company vs. Glover is reported at 113 Ga.App. 815, 149
S.E.2d 852.
8

See also, Lamb vs. Horwick, 48 Ill.App.2d 251, 198
N.E.2d 194; Wert vs. Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453, 197
N.E.2d 717; Alston vs. Amalgamated Mutual Casualty
Company, 53 Misc.2d 90, 278 N.Y.S.2d 906.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
vs. Jiles, 115 Ga.App. 193, 154 S.E.2d 286 (1967) was an
action by a wife against a motorist for injuries received
in a collision between automobiles operated by an uninsured motorist and her husband and the husband's action
for medical expenses incurred on behalf of his wife, loss
of her services, property damage to his automobile, and
loss of use thereof. Plaintiffs' uninsured motorist insurer
petitioned for intervention and moved for consolidation of
the cases. The Trial Court sustained general demurrers
and the insurer appealed. The Court of Appeals held that
the insurer was entitled to intervene, but that the actions
were not the kind which could be consolidated.
Another case which lends support to the holdings in
those cases discussed above is Indiana Insurance Company
vs. Noble, 265 N.E.2d 419 (Ind., 1970). That case involved an action to recover under the uninsured motorist provision of an automobile liability insurance policy. The
Trial Court granted the insured's Motion for Summary
Judgment and the insurer appealed. The Appellate Court
held that although the 17 year old insured, through her
next friend, filed an action against the uninsured motorist
above without joining the insurer as a party defendant
to litigate the issues of liability and damages, and where
the insured had given preliminary and adequate notice
of the filing and pendency of the action to the insurer
9

so that it could have taken appropriate action including
intervention, the resulting judgment against the uninsur.
ed motorist was binding on the insurer absent any show.
ing of fraud, misrepresentation or collusion.
See also, Wells vs. Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Company, 459 S.W.2d 259 (1970) for cases cited by the
court where insurers were estopped from relitigating issues in an action brought by an insured against the uninsured motorist when the insurer could have intervened in
order to protect its interests.
It is apparent that the interest of appellant, Trans·
national Insurance Company, is a pecuniary one, and this
is coupled with the fact that the company will be affected
and will stand to lose or gain by direct legal operation of
any judgment that may be granted. Also, to be considered
with this set of circumstances is the fact that the company
does not have any control over the defense of the action.
As it now stands counsel for plaintiff and defendants
could stipulate to a judgment in favor of plaintiff and
against defendants without the right of appellant to say
then yea or nay. After such action then plaintiff could
then initiate an action against appellant on the policy
thereby obviating appellant's right and the necessity of
litigating the issues of liability and damages. It should
be made clear that appellant does not contend or allege
that counsel for the parties are going to so act at this
time; however, appellant is subject to that risk.
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To be considered further in this matter is the fact
that if appellant does not seek to intervene in this action
in order to protect its interests it will in all probability
be estopped to do so in a subsequent action by plaintiff
on the uninsured motorist provision of the policy. It
would seem that the equities of the situation dictate that
appellant be permitted to intervene in this action to reasonably protect its interests.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing argument and authorities,
appellant takes the position that this Court should reverse the order of the District Court denying appellant
leave to intervene in the above-entitled action for the
purposes of having the issues of liability and damages
fully litigated in order that appellant's interests in this
matter be adequately protected.
Respectfully submitted,
D. GARY CHRISTIAN, ESQ.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN
520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appelltmt
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